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Chapter I. A Look at the Letter 
i. Introduction 
To many readers, the most striking feature of Spinoza’s Ethics is its geometric 
order: the step-by-step progression from definitions and axioms to numbered propositions 
and scholia. Thus, it is tempting to read the Ethics strictly as a deductive system, with the 
justification of the later arguments coming from the groundwork established by earlier 
propositions. Despite this temptation, I believe a richer understanding will come from 
both reading between the lines and looking outside of the system. Once we examine the 
technical terms and ideas explicated in Spinoza’s other writings, we can gain a clearer 
understanding of the Ethics as a philosophical system that draws upon theories external to 
the book. One concept which can be saved from ambiguity through this methodology is 
the infinite, which is crucial to many aspects of Spinoza’s philosophy, including 
Substance, Attributes, and certain kinds of Modes.
1
 Although it plays a role in several 
key places in the Ethics, there are no explicit distinctions among the divergent ways 
Spinoza conceives of infinity; nor is any detailed definition of the infinite present in the 
Ethics. 
However, Spinoza’s earlier “Letter on the Infinite,” (Letter 12) explains the 
meaning of the term “infinite” in considerable detail. This chapter reviews three types of 
infinity identified in Letter 12. First there are things that are (1) “infinite by their own 
nature,” next are things (2) “infinite by virtue of the cause in which they inhere,” and 
                                                 
1
 Capitalization in original. 
 2 
finally (3) “things that can be called infinite, or if you prefer, indefinite, because they 
cannot be expressed by any number, while yet being conceivable as greater or less.” 
(106).
2
 After explaining these three categories and their places in Letter 12, I propose a 
way to understand these categories and use them as a lens to gain a clearer understanding 
of key arguments in the Ethics. 
         Figure 1 below represents Spinoza’s taxonomy of the infinite. Corresponding to 
each of the kinds of infinity are distinct ontological, temporal, and spatial categories. For 
example, things infinite by cause are the Modes, which possess Duration and Quantity.  
Kind of Infinity Ontological Level Temporal 
Properties 
Spatial 
Properties 
Infinite by Nature Substance Eternity Extension 
Infinite by Cause Modes Duration Quantity 
Indefinite Aids of the 
Imagination 
Time Measure 
Figure 1. 
 
Spinoza’s Letter 12 was written in 1663 to Lodewijk Meyer, Spinoza’s editor and 
personal friend. The letter aimed to explain “the causes of the errors and confusion that 
have arisen regarding the question of the infinite” (106). For Spinoza, these errors arise 
“through [a] failure to distinguish” between different types of infinity and their 
corresponding properties (101). Because Spinoza believed that confusion about the 
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 All references to page numbers refer to Shirley’s 1995 edition of The Letters. Additionally, 
citations from the Ethics come from Curley’s 1985 The Collected Works of Spinoza. 
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infinite typically arises through conflating distinct concepts, he thought it necessary to 
fully explain the different types of infinity. Having done so, he shows how their spatial 
and temporal properties follow from their breed of infinity.  
Spinoza’s discussion of the infinite draws on several sources, including Descartes, 
who distinguished between infinites comprehended by the understanding and those 
conceived in the imagination. The former cannot be divided, while the latter can. 
Descartes often referred to this latter type as the “indefinite.”3 However, unlike Descartes 
and previous philosophers, Spinoza believes that puzzles stemming from the infinite are 
not a consequence of the mind’s limitations, but are the result of a failure to adequately 
distinguish between the different kinds of infinity. Spinoza summarizes these three kinds 
of infinity near the end of Letter 12: 
“[1] certain things are infinite by their own nature and cannot in any way be 
conceived as finite, [2] while other things are infinite by virtue of the cause in 
which they inhere; and when the latter are conceived in abstraction, they can be 
divided into parts and be regarded as finite. [3] Finally, there are things that can 
be called infinite, or if you prefer, indefinite, because they cannot be accurately 
expressed by any number, while yet being conceivable as greater or less” (106, 
numbering added). 
In the sections that follow, I take up the three levels of infinity in turn. 
ii. Substance: Eternity and Extension 
         In Letter 12, Spinoza makes three important observations about Substance. First, 
Substance necessarily exists by definition, meaning that its essence and existence are one 
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 Descartes, Letter to Mersenne 27 May 1630.  cf Ariew 1990.  
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and the same. Second, “Substance is not manifold.” Spinoza explains that by this, he 
means that for any essence, there can only be one substance which possesses that 
essential feature.
4
 And third, Substance is necessarily infinite, conceptually as well as 
actually (102). For Spinoza, it is as self-contradictory to attribute finitude to substance as 
it is to attribute quadri-linearity to circle. These features of Substance entail that it is 
metaphysically prior to all other parts of Spinoza’s world. Only Substance can exist 
without depending on anything else. In the Ethics, Spinoza refers to the one existing 
Substance as God.
5
 Although his view of God is highly unorthodox in many respects, 
Spinoza’s concept of Substance as necessary and infinite is similar to traditional 
theological accounts of God, that don’t assign a creator to God. 
Thus, Spinoza’s Substance requires an account of what it means for something to 
exist by definition. He provides this account through his explication of Eternity. Eternal 
existence is a temporal property for Spinoza in only a very broad sense, for it designates 
beings which exist outside of any possible alteration or limitation. Platonic Forms, or 
mathematical truths, like “2+2=4,” would normally be considered Eternal in this sense 
(even though Spinoza does not think such objects exist).  
Spinoza maintains that the necessity and immutability of Eternal existence require 
it to be indivisible. Consequently, Eternity has no parts and cannot be evaluated with 
comparative terms like more or less, or before and after (103). Because they are 
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 This property remains in the Ethics, but rather than talking about Substance not being 
“manifold,” it is described in terms of Substances being unable to share Attributes. cf EIP5. 
5
 EIP14. 
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absolutely necessary, Eternal being never begin or cease to exist; Spinoza calls “an 
infinite enjoyment of existence or - pardon the Latin - of being (essendi)” (102). 
The spatial or Extended Attributes of Substance likewise do not allow parts or 
division. This way of conceiving Extended Substance obviously diverges heavily from 
common conceptions of space. As Alison Peterman argues, when Spinoza refers to the 
Extension of Substance, this is not the type of extension possessed by three-dimensional 
objects. Instead, she argues that the type of Extension used by Spinoza is fundamentally 
indivisible in reality.
6
 If, contrary to Spinoza, we follow the usual way of conceiving 
Extension, as an unbounded three-dimensional Euclidean space with no inherent 
divisions, we end up with a space that can still be divided in the imagination. For 
instance, we could arbitrarily divide this space into different parts by using a coordinate 
system. But Spinoza would object that this merely conceptual division is contrary to the 
true nature of Extended Substance, for we are discussing something which has a 
necessary unity. This is why Spinoza compares the idea that Substance is an infinite 
aggregation of parts with the contradictory notion of a square created by adding circles 
together (103). What we get from adding parts together endlessly is not the full-blown 
infinity of Extended Substance. Beings “infinite by their own nature” are necessarily 
indivisible, and not merely unbounded. 
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iii. Modes: Duration and Quantity 
Modes are on the next rung of Spinoza’s ontological ladder. He defines Modes as 
“the affections of Substance” (102).7 As such, they are ontologically posterior to 
Substance; Modes cannot exist without Substance, although Substance does not depend 
on the existence of Modes.
8
 For Spinoza, this level comprises all the familiar entities of 
the universe, which are not individual Substances, as other Modern philosophers claimed. 
The level of Modes includes human beings, animals, and atoms. But how exactly do the 
Modes relate to Substance, considering that modes depend on substance, but not vice-
versa? In particular, how do finite material things relate to Infinite Extension, as 
understood by Spinoza? According to Bennett's influential “field-metaphysic” 
interpretation, the Modes are just different parts of Extension possessing various 
properties, such as redness or softness, at different times and locations.
9
 Despite its 
influence, I would like to argue this reading is untenable, given the clarifications 
provided by Letter 12. But first, I should explain how Modes are understood in this letter. 
Spinoza’s use of Modes in Letter 12 contains terminology that parallels the 
discussion of Substance. Whereas Substance falls under the category of “Eternity,” 
Modes have the property of “Duration.” Duration, like Eternity, is a way of 
understanding an object’s existence. Consider a particular Mode, such as a single cup. 
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 There are different ways of interpreting the ontology of modes, such as whether they are bona 
fide objects in the usual sense of the term, or just properties predicated on Substance (Newlands). 
For the purposes of this paper, I will be neutral about their ultimate nature, and describe how they 
are examples of that which is infinite by “the force of the cause in which they inhere,” comparing 
this infinity with the type possessed by Substance. 
8
 Melamed, 2000. p. 207. 
9
 Bennett, 1984. pp. 91-3. 
 7 
Considered apart from the whole order of nature, there is nothing intrinsic to the idea of 
that cup which determines the beginning or end of its existence. However, considered in 
relation to other objects in nature, it will begin and end through the effects of other 
Modes. Thus, we can speak of other events which happened before its existence, during 
its Duration, and after its end (102-3). We can imagine cases where the Mode began or 
ended in a different way, or even failed to exist. The cup exists not by definition, but 
because of the causal ordering of nature. For this reason, its existence is described by 
Duration, rather than Eternity. 
Spinoza elaborates upon this line of thought in the Ethics. In Part I, he postulates 
a world consisting of only 20 people (IP8schol2). The reason why there are only 20 
people in this world cannot be derived from the concept of human nature; rather, the 
explanation must invoke the order and connection of other finite entities. This collection 
of 20 people is a Mode, and endures with a Duration, for unlike Eternal Substance, its 
existence is not entailed by its essence alone. In fact, nothing in the Mode considered in 
itself determines what its Duration will be. In Spinoza’s words, “we can arbitrarily 
delimit the existence and duration of Modes without thereby impairing to any extent our 
conception of them” (103). So, while the concept of a Substance necessarily entailed its 
existence, additional facts are needed to explain the Duration of Modes.  
So far, I have discussed the Modes with finite Duration, but despite their lack of 
intrinsically  necessary existence, Modes can still be described as infinite. Suppose a 
particle, despite its place in the order of nature, exists without end. It simply happens to 
have always existed, and through the causes present in nature, it always will exist. 
Despite its continual existence, we can imagine alternate facts about the world that could 
 8 
cause the particle to be destroyed at some point in time. This is not possible for 
Substance, Spinoza argues, since Substance has an “infinite enjoyment of existence” by 
its very essence (102). This is why even unlimited Duration is separate from Eternity, for 
Substance could have never possessed anything but Eternity, and we cannot conceive of 
how Substance could fail to be Eternal. We can entertain counterfactual situations of 
Modes with infinite Duration coming into and out of being by changing other facts of the 
world, yet this is not so with Substance. Therefore, we can say that even though Modes 
can have an infinite Duration, they never rise to the level of infinity possessed by 
Substance. 
The distinction between Eternal things and Durational beings has not been fully 
appreciated by many writing on Spinoza’s metaphysics. Some commentators, such as 
Jonathan Bennett have argued against the strict distinction between Eternity and Duration 
claiming that Eternal objects also participate in an endless Duration. Bennett claims that 
“Eternity is a species of Duration, marked off by the differentia ‘necessary.’”10 On his 
view, Eternal Substance exists temporally alongside the Modes. Bennett acknowledges 
that although Modes can exist without end, they are not Eternal, since they do not exist 
by necessity. However, I believe that Bennett’s arguments ignore the points present in 
Letter 12. While Bennett correctly holds that Eternity and unlimited Duration (also 
known as sempiternity)
11
 are two distinct concepts, he incorrectly states that the Eternity 
of an object implies its sempiternity. The distinction between Eternity and unlimited 
Duration is not just that Eternity implies absolute certainty about existence. Rather, 
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 Kneale, 1979. 
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Eternity is entirely separate from Duration, for in Spinoza’s words: “it is to the existence 
of Modes alone that we can apply the term Duration” (102), and this is true even of the 
infinite Duration of sempiternity. 
The reason why Bennett believes Eternity entails sempiternity is because he 
thinks that if Extension is divisible, then eternity must be divisible as well.
12
 I agree with 
the conditional, yet infer that because Eternity is indivisible, then Extension cannot be 
divided. In other words, his modus ponens is my modus tollens. I will now explain how 
Modes relate to the infinite Extension of Substance, and what this means for 
interpretations about the infinite nature of Extension. 
Just as Eternity and Duration represent the kinds of temporal infinity which 
correspond to Substance and Mode, there is a pair of properties that express two distinct 
spatial infinities, namely Extension and Quantity. Quantity is a property of the Modes, 
and Extension belongs to Substance. Although Spinoza does not give a detailed account 
of Quantity in Letter 12, he clearly considers it as analogous to Duration.
13
 Spinoza says 
that we can conceive of Quantity in two ways, either abstractly, or in itself (103). Using a 
clear understanding, “if we have regard to it as it is in the intellect and we apprehend the 
thing as it is in itself (and this is very difficult), then it is found to be infinite, indivisible, 
and one alone.” (103). However, conceived in the abstract sense, we imagine the 
Quantity of individual Modes, which can be divided by the mind.  
We have already seen how a never-ending progression of Duration is distinct 
from Eternity, and Spinoza would likewise be committed to saying that a Quantity 
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comprising the collection of every Mode in the universe is distinct from Extended 
Substance. This Quantity is posterior to the existence of Modes, but no individual Mode 
is involved in the bare essence of Substance. Furthermore, this supposed collection of 
modes, since it consists of parts, cannot be attributed to the indivisible infinity of 
Substance. Instead, it is infinite only because it is composed by infinite Modes.  
This point is confirmed in the Ethics, where Spinoza states that as an Attribute of 
God, the Extension of Substance cannot be composed by aggregating finite pieces. He 
states that the absurdities which follow from imagining that God is corporeal “do not at 
all follow from the fact that an infinite quantity is supposed, but from the fact that they 
suppose an infinite quantity to be measurable and composed of finite parts” (EIP15). 
However, there appears to be a contradiction, coming from the scholium to the 7th 
Lemma of the “physical interlude” of Book II, where Spinoza states: “But if we should 
further conceive a third kind of Individual, composed [NS: of many individuals] of this 
second kind, we shall find that it can be affected in many other ways, without any change 
to its form. And if we proceed in this way to infinity, we shall easily conceive that the 
whole of nature is one Individual, whose parts, i.e., all bodies vary in infinite ways, 
without any change of the whole Individual” (EIIL7Schol). It seems that he contradicts 
himself by talking about “the whole of nature” possessing parts, while at the same time 
denying parthood to quantity as conceived through Substance in IP15.  
Lee Rice attempts to solve this inconsistency by arguing that the second passage 
starts with the infinite collection as a given whole, rather than trying to build the concept 
up from finite pieces. Under this interpretation, the infinity of Substance can be divided 
 11 
into finite parts, but it cannot be constructed from adding finite pieces.
14
 To go back to 
Spinoza’s analogy, this is not like adding circles together to try and get a square, which 
would be trying to fit incompatible pieces together. Instead, it is like trying to add 
geometric points together to form a continuous line. We cannot construct a line by adding 
points together piece by piece in our minds, but once given the line, we can identify 
points within it. Rice resolves the contradiction by saying that EIP15 means that 
Extension cannot be iteratively composed of adding pieces together, while the Scholium 
to the 7th Lemma is analogous to identifying points on a previously given line. However, 
there is a superior way of resolving this contradiction. This comes from recognizing that 
Spinoza is employing two separate concepts in both passages: Extension in the case of 
IP15 and Quantity in the case the 7th Lemma. Even though he refers to it as a “quantity” 
in the quote provided, he goes on to describe that the quantity can be conceived as 
divisible through the distorted lens of the imagination, or as an “infinite, unique, and 
indivisible”15 property of Substance, meaning that he is referring to Extension in the 
technical sense of the term. Conceived properly, Extension cannot be divided into parts, 
but collections of Quantity can. This resolution involves recognizing that these really are 
differences of kind, not degree.
16
 
Bennett takes the Eternity and Extension of Substance to be equally divisible, 
whereas Peterman and I take them both to be indivisible, based on the evidence in Letter 
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 Rice, 1996. p. 35. 
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 This line, and the full sentence in which it occurs, is an almost verbatim repetition of the quote 
from Letter 12 from two paragraphs ago, showing how committed Spinoza was to the arguments 
of Letter 12 while writing The Ethics. 
16
 This reading may be amenable to Rice’s overall interpretation of Spinoza, as he acknowledges 
that Spinoza conceives of infinities as differing by kind, not merely degree. 
 12 
12. Given the framework provided in this letter, we can see that it is a category error to 
attribute infinite Duration or Quantity to Substance. Substance cannot have infinite 
Duration (or Quantity), as Spinoza says that “it is to the existence of Modes alone that we 
can apply the term Duration.” (102). In the very next paragraph, Spinoza goes on to argue 
that attending to the right kinds of infinity shows us that “it is nonsense, bordering on 
madness, to hold that extended Substance is composed of parts or bodies really distinct 
from one another.” (103). Given what Spinoza says about Eternity and Duration, the best 
way to read this passage is that the “nonsense” involves predicating the wrong type of 
infinity to the wrong category of objects; it involves ascribing to Substance the infinity 
that corresponds to causes, rather than its proper type: that which is infinite by nature. 
The former can be conceived of as divisible, while the latter cannot.  
If Spinoza were offering some sort of set-theoretical account of infinity, it might 
make sense to say that infinite Duration follows from the greater infinity of Eternity, just 
as the integers form a subset of the real numbers. Anachronistically, a solution in this 
vein commits the error of using mathematical concepts developed well after Spinoza’s 
death to interpret his work.
17
 Even more problematic is the fact that it ignores the crucial 
difference between the levels of infinity presented by Spinoza, which is neither cardinal 
nor ordinal, but metaphysical. 
iv. Aids of the Imagination: Time, Measure, and Number 
         Aids of the imagination constitute the final level in the metaphysical system of 
Letter 12. He lists these as Time, Measure, and Number. When we observe modes 
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coming into and going out of existence, we use Time in order to quantify and easily 
compare different Durations. Similarly, to compare the Quantity of Modes, we apply 
Measure (103-4). Time and Measure are not concepts which inhere in nature, but are 
“aids of the imagination” or “mental constructs.”(104). The process of abstraction is also 
the source of Number, which is used to convey information about classes constructed by 
the mind (104). For example, in Letter 50, Spinoza says “he who holds in his hand a 
penny and a dollar will not think of the number two unless he can apply a common name 
to this penny and dollar, that is, pieces of money or coins” (259). 
Interestingly, Spinoza’s account of number seems to anticipate a view later 
demployed by Frege. Indeed, Frege cites this letter when explaining his concept of 
number as an extension of a concept.
18
 It is only once we have divided objects into 
categories that we can apply a number to them. I may say that there is one book on the 
table, or 404 pages, depending on which concept I apply. Spinoza considers such 
concepts to be human impositions on reality. We say that there are 404 pages because we 
ignore the different words on each page, and the different molecules which compose each 
individual page, for we focus on the similarities relevant to practical interest instead. 
Melamed notes that Spinoza acknowledges that numbers can possess a rigorous order, 
but Melamed explains that for Spinoza, these “are orders which do not reflect the real 
order of modes within substance.”19 Due to their abstraction from the true order of nature, 
Spinoza classifies Numbers as an aid of the imagination. Unlike Frege, who is a realist 
about concepts and numbers, Spinoza’s nominalism about concepts leads him to reject 
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the idea that number can apply to matters of deep metaphysics. Number represents a type 
of double abstraction from reality for Spinoza; we first use our imagination to create 
classes of objects, and then extend that concept to produce Number. 
As aids of the imagination, all three of Time, Measure, and Number fail to capture 
key aspects of reality. They may be useful on pragmatic grounds, but they cannot provide 
us with information about Substance or Eternity.
20
 All three concepts contain properties 
that are distorted reflections of the ways things really are. Spinoza’s epistemology draws 
a line between imagining a concept and understanding it; “there are many things that can 
in no way be apprehended by the imagination but only by the intellect, such as Substance, 
Eternity, and other things.” (104). Because our reasoning with Number, Time, and 
Measure all involve ignoring the relations the Modes have within Substance, the resulting 
relations among the aids of imagination have left the realm of understanding.
21
  
Spinoza thinks that Zeno-style paradoxes arise from a misapplication of the aids 
of the imagination to reality. He considers a person who wonders how an hour of Time 
could pass, for first half an hour must pass, and then a quarter, and so on, ad infinitum. 
He rejects one way of solving this problem, which is to suppose that Duration is 
composed of discrete moments, a proposal Spinoza compares to “say[ing] that Number is 
made up of simply adding noughts together” (104). Spinoza’s alternative diagnosis of the 
paradox is that it conflates Duration with Time, the aid of our imaginations. The person 
supposes that the Duration of the hour has the structure of Time, that is, composed of 
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infinitely divisible parts. But this is to confuse the structure of our mental aids the 
underlying reality. 
For an additional example illustrating the misapplication of imaginary constructs 
to reality consider that we use names to designate the colors of the spectrum: red, blue, 
yellow, green, white, and so on. When we confuse these categories with the spectrum 
itself, we are led to puzzles like when one category of colors ends, and another begins, 
such as “what is the exact frequency of light where yellow become orange?” These 
puzzles only arise from confusing mental categories with objective reality, just like 
Spinoza’s diagnosis of the Zeno paradox. Once we realize that our color concepts are a 
matter of convention, these puzzles dissolve, for color concepts do not carve nature at its 
joints. 
There remains a difficulty in Spinoza’s account of the aids of the imagination, He 
writes: “it is obvious from the above [an example of infinitely dividing time] that neither 
Number, Measure, nor Time, being merely aids to the imagination can be infinite, for in 
that case Number would not be number, nor Measure measure, nor Time time.” (p. 104). 
His use of capitalization indicates, I believe, that he wants to underscore the particular 
function of these aids. In particular, the function of Measure requires a conventional 
metric that allows us to navigate the world in the proper ways. Time requires a unit like 
hours, Measure needs something like meters, and Number is represented by integers. He 
is not saying that mental constructs must be finite by logical necessity; instead, he 
believes that in order to aid us in the standard ways, they need to possess a finite 
structure. We could think of a ruler with neither ends nor markings, but it wouldn’t fill 
the role that normal finite rulers play in our society. If we use this ruler as the basis for 
 16 
our system of something we call “Measure,” we wouldn’t be in line with our typical 
usage of the term “measure.” It would be like constructing a morality that permits killing 
without needing to provide a stronger justification than “I felt like it.” It may be an 
“Ethical” system under a formal definition that states that all we need for a system of 
Ethics is any set of action-guiding principles, but it would by no means be “ethical” under 
standard uses of the word. 
Understanding why Spinoza believes that aids of the imagination must be finite 
informs us about his views on the way metrics relate to nature. Spinoza is not saying that 
the parts of nature that we mesure must be finite; his point focuses on the tools that we 
use to do this. To show why this is the case, we must begin with the purposes of Time, 
Measure, and Number. As aids of the imagination, by definition, they must aid us. By 
using these aids as standard metrics, I can say: “I’ll see you in an hour,” rather than 
describing each event which will occur between now and when I see you as specific, 
unique concepts. As metrics, these concepts give us terms we can use to navigate the 
world and communicate with one another by abstracting to obtain the relevant properties.  
One standard metric of Measure could be a specific bar of metal; I abstract from 
the exact causal history and specific molecules which compose the bar’s Quantity, and 
arrive at a unit of Measure, say a meter. Using this unit of Measure, I could discuss what 
it means for object to be two meters or half a meter; I simply double or halve the initial 
unit of Measure. If I am 5 meters away from something and take a 1-meter step back, I 
would be 6 meters away. But what if my starting unit were infinite? If the universe has no 
furthest distance, I could define my unit of Measure as the distance from my position as I 
write this paper to the infinite distance directly in front of me; let’s call this Measure an 
 17 
infinimeter. What would it mean to say that something is twice as long as an infinimeter, 
or half as long, since we would still have an infinite length no matter how we divide or 
multiply it in this way? If I am an infinimeter away from the edge of the universe, and 
take one step back, I will still be an infinimeter away, despite having moved.  
I believe that this is what Spinoza means when he says that Measure cannot be 
infinite. Spinoza is not talking about Quantity itself, but rather the units we use to 
measure it. Infinite “Measure” is not “measure” because of its radical difference from the 
finite metrics which can be associated with addition, division, and multiplication in 
familiar ways. The problem with the infinimeter is that dividing it in half or multiplying it 
by two does not give us the same results as multiplying and dividing a meter, a finite unit 
of Measure. And clearly a similar point could be made about Time, as an abstraction 
from Duration. What if rather than measuring the world in seconds, minutes, or hours, we 
started with an infinite metric, such as the “infiniyear,” which starts now, and proceeds 
without end? We run into the same problems as we did with units of Measure based on an 
infinite Quantity. What sense can we make of comparing events when applying infinite 
Time, since one infiniyear starting at a given moment would mark off just as much time 
as using 1/100th of an infiniyear proceeding from the same starting point? As concepts 
which help us navigate the world, Measure and Time must be divisible in ways that 
produce numerable units when split in half or added together in finite iterations, rather 
than being infinite all the way down. 
Given that in order to be useful, our units of Time and Measure must be finite, 
explaining why Number cannot be infinite is the next step. This claim may be confusing 
to the modern reader. After all, given any number, we can always find one which is 
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bigger. Isn’t this enough to say that the series of numbers are infinite?22 While this may 
allow us to think of the series as infinite, the best reading of the claim that Number 
cannot be infinite is that no individual Number can be infinite, just as no single unit of 
Measure or Time can be infinite. What if instead of giving a number composed of 
numerals, we used ∞, ω, א, or another symbol to signify an infinite number and its 
properties? I think that to Spinoza, such signs are not Numbers, as they are not the result 
of combining other integers together in a finite process.  
 the categories of Modes we create. In order to show that an infinite “Number” 
would not have the standard properties of numbers, we can think about the distorted 
relations between traditional part/whole relations which occur in infinite collections, 
which are show by Galileo's Paradox: 
Positive Integers: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 … 
Perfect Squares: 1   4 9 16 25 36 49 … 
For every integer, there is a corresponding square. Given that both series are infinite, we 
will never “run out” of integers or perfect squares. However, the perfect squares are a 
proper subset of the positive integers, but we have just established a 1-1 correspondence 
between the two series. For those unfamiliar with the properties of transfinite math, this 
would be as shocking as claiming that I have the same number of fingers on my left hand 
as I do on both hands. Our standard intuitions about numerical relationships are subverted 
when considering infinite series because a proper part can be equal to its whole. This may 
be why Spinoza did not think that it was proper to call any type of infinity a Number. 
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Spinoza was not alone in this practice; equating “Number” with “finite Number” was a 
practice shared by most Early Modern philosophers and mathematicians.
23
 
Since Cantor, and the development of transfinite set theory, this difficulty has 
been resolved. We now accept that in the case of infinite collections, a proper subset can 
have the same cardinality as the whole. Indeed, this is one way of defining what it means 
for a set to be infinite. However, for Spinoza, these aids cannot serve their function when 
they are finite, as then there will be ambiguities about how exactly the infinimeter divides 
Quantity, to name one example. 
 Given that there cannot be an infinite Number, in what sense can an aid of the 
imagination be called infinite? He tells us that there are “things that can be called infinite, 
or if you prefer, indefinite, because they cannot be expressed by any number, while yet 
being conceivable as greater or less” (106). To illustrate this he provides an instructive 
example in Letter 12. Consider two inscribed non-concentric circles: 
 
Figure 2: Spinoza’s circles. 
Spinoza points out that in this example, we can know the distance of segments AB and 
CD, which are the maximum and minimum distance between the two circles, respectively 
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(105). However, we can create a never-ending number of additional segments between 
this maximum and minimum
24
: 
 
Figure 3: More distances. 
In other words, the question of how many differences in distances there are between the 
two circles cannot be associated with a finite number. And, since we already saw that 
Spinoza regards all numbers as finite, Spinoza would say that we cannot assign any 
number to this collection, but it is still infinite. However, Spinoza says that we can 
conceive of these infinities as greater or less, since the amount of distances in a part of 
this space can be conceived of as lesser than the amount of distances in the whole of the 
image. For example, if we cut the figure into quarter circles, there will still be an infinite 
number of lines we can draw, and for any one quarter there will be lines that are in the 
whole, but not this part. However, we still call both call the part and the whole infinite.
25
 
Therefore, even though infinities of the third kind are such that “number is inapplicable 
to it without manifest contradiction,” we can still conceive of them as “greater or less,” 
since we can talk about part/whole relations despite  (105-106). This is the most moderate 
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kind of infinity, for it only comes about as a result of the mind’s ability to imagine 
infinite division.  
 
 v. Beyond the Letter  
 In this chapter, I have attempted to clarify Spinoza’s provocative claim that there 
are three radically different infinities, corresponding to Substance, Modes, and the aids of 
the imagination. By clarifying these concepts, I have shown how to solve standard 
problems in interpreting Spinoza’s thought, which assume that Spinoza’s concept of 
infinity is akin to our more unified contemporary notion. By attending to the sharp lines 
Spinoza places between the types of infinity, we can come to definitive interpretations of 
what Spinoza meant by “Extension” and “Quantity,” to name just one pair of terms which 
have puzzled commentators. In the following chapters, I use the type of infinity which 
applies to substance to answer questions about how many attributes there are within 
substance, as well as how to reconcile the indivisibility of substance with the separation 
between the attributes. From there, I address the second degree of infinity, that which is 
infinite by nature, to explain Spinoza’s concept of an infinite mode. The concept of 
infinite by cause can also be used to understand infinite collections of finite modes, 
which can provide insights into Spinoza’s famed parallelism doctrine. I also explore 
Spinoza’s legacy when it comes to the infinite, showing the influence he may have had 
on Leibniz and Cantor. 
  
 22 
Chapter 2: A God of Infinite Attributes. 
 
 Now that I have set down the groundwork for understanding Spinoza’s concept of 
infinity, it is time to turn to Spinoza’s magnum opus, The Ethics. This chapter will focus 
on the Attributes, which Spinoza defines in ID4 as “That which the intellect perceives of 
a substance, as constituting its essence,” and God, who is defined in ID6 as “a being 
absolutely infinite, that is, a substance consisting of an infinitely many attributes, of 
which each one expresses an eternal and infinite essence.” Despite the promising 
structure of the ordo geometrico, there are numerous puzzles as to exactly what Spinoza 
means by these definitions. For instance, are the attributes really distinct from one 
another in God, or is their division merely conceived in the human mind? Is God 
ontologically prior to the attributes, or does God emerge from taking the attributes as a 
collected whole? Additionally, Spinoza says there are an infinity of attributes, yet only 
lists two in The Ethics, thought and extension. Spinoza was aware that claiming God had 
infinite attributes and then only listing two would leave many unsatisfied; Spinoza 
addresses this concern in “Letter 64,” written to G.H. Schullerin 1675, albeit in an 
equally unsatisfying way. With an eye towards Letter 12, it is time to visit the scholarship 
around these questions. 
 But before entering into the interpretive questions, it is important first to have a 
sense of what the text asserts. First of all, the attributes are connected to substance, with 
substance defined as “what is in itself and is conceived through itself, that is, that whose 
concept does not require the concept of another thing from which it must be formed” 
(ID3). As mentioned above, attributes are defined as “That which the intellect perceives 
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of a substance, as constituting its essence” (IP4). Considered in themselves, the attributes 
are prior to any individual finite being. So, the attribute of thought has an ontological 
priority over any specific mind, and the attribute of extension is required for there to be 
any specific bodies. This is what Spinoza means when he claims in IP1 that “a substance 
is prior in nature to its affections.” Spinoza also claims no two substances can share the 
same attribute, in a very puzzling proposition which will be discussed later. He goes on to 
say that God is the only substance in nature, and “whatever is, is in God” (IP14-15). 
Therefore, all the objects of our everyday world are just minor properties of substance, 
rather than beings which have an existence independent of, or “outside of,” God. Does 
this mean that humans are the union of a thinking thing and a separate extended thing, 
where the mind tells the body to act, and the body gives information to the mind? For 
Spinoza, the answer is an emphatic “no.” Since they are infinite in kind, the attributes 
possess autonomy over their domains, so to speak. Nothing in the attribute of thought can 
affect any mode whatsoever in the attribute of extension, and vice versa. This is argued 
through the fact that the attributes of mind and extension have no essential 
commonalities, and IP3 states “if things have nothing in common with one another, one 
of them cannot be the cause of the other.” Despite being causally isolated from one 
another, the structures of the modes in both attributes are isomorphic, as explained by 
Spinoza’s famous IIP7: “The order and connections of ideas is the same as the order and 
connection of things.” So the order and connection of the physical world involves bodies 
related to each other in causal ways, such as there being six chairs around the dining 
table. And in the attribute of the intellect, there will be a relationship isomorphic to this 
physical arrangement. 
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 Combined with the isolation across attributes, this means that we can construct 
different causal stories for the same event, but under different attributes. I could talk 
about the world in purely physical terms, saying that light of a certain wavelength struck 
my eyes, caused the rods and cones to trigger activity in the nerves leading to my brain, 
which caused complex processes involving signals being sent to my arm causing me to 
reach forward, and so on. Or, the same order of events could be described under the 
attribute of thought, by saying that I had a perception of seeing a slice of pizza, and then I 
felt an urge to eat the pizza, followed by an experience of my arm extending forward, and 
so on. For Spinoza, these two stories describe the same structural sequence of events, but 
considered under different attributes. Although the causal sequence in thought has a 
counterpart in extension, neither requires us to call in other attributes during the course of 
our explanation. However, in Spinoza’s account, many questions are left unanswered. I 
will now try to address some of these problems. 
i. The Substance with All Attributes 
 Proposition 5 of Book I states “In nature, there cannot be two or more substances 
of the same nature or attribute.” While this may not seem like an important matter at first 
glance, it is one of the foundations of his whole system. Later on, in IP14, Spinoza uses 
this proposition to argue that there is just one substance, i.e. God. Spinoza’s strategy to 
prove this substance monism is to first show that no attribute can be possessed by two 
substances. From there, he shows that a substance outside of God would entail a 
contradiction. Due to this foundational role, a lot rides on the proof that no two 
substances can have the same attribute. 
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The proof of this crucial proposition starts with two possible criteria for 
distinguishing substances from one another: by a difference in attributes or in affections. 
He says if we distinguish them by their attributes “then it will be conceded that there is 
only one of the same attribute,” which means that if we’re using the fact that they possess 
different attributes to distinguish the substances, then there will be no attributes that are 
shared (more on this later). The other option to distinguish two substances is to look at 
their modes. If we distinguish them by a difference in affections or modes, then we’re 
committing a category error, since particular affections/modes aren’t a part of the 
essential nature of a substance. Instead, we need to consider the nature of the attributes 
themselves. And once we do this, we would have two of the same attributes, so there 
would be no way to distinguish between the supposedly different attributes.
26
 A 
substance which has extension and an ordering of nature which differs from our own, 
where Earth is the 4th planet from the sun, for instance, could not be considered as a 
possible counterexample, since neither ordering of the planets is contained in the very 
definition of any attribute. But even if we concede this point to Spinoza in the case of 
substances with only one attribute, we could still raise objections in the cases of 
substances which have multiple attributes. Why can’t the substance consisting of thought 
and extension be distinguished from the substance consisting only of thought? Or even 
worse, what about a substance with attributes A and B and another one with attributes B 
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and C? Even though they share B in common, we could distinguish them by virtue of 
their disjoint attributes: A and C.
27
  
 The proper response to this line of argument is that the non-shared attributes are 
irrelevant when considering the supposedly shared attributes. After all, Spinoza says in 
IP10 that “each attribute of a substance must be conceived through itself.” Like the causal 
stories about modes, explained above, identification of substance needs to be restricted to 
considering just one attribute at a time. Here, Spinoza refers to Definitions 4 and 3: that 
an attribute is what an intellect ascribes to the essence of a substance, and the definition 
of a substance entails that we can grasp the substance with its essence alone, which 
makes the objection which ended the last paragraph invalid. For if we think about the 
attribute B from the previous paragraph, it’s implied that conceiving of it alone will mean 
we’re conceiving of it as constituting the essence of a substance. Let’s call this 
SubstanceB. However, we supposed that there is a substance with A, as well as a 
substance with C. So, now we actually have two substances:  SubstanceB+A and 
SubstanceB+C. Unfortunately for this solution, this involves introducing another attribute 
to properly conceive of a substance, contrary to the definition of substance provided. So, 
B cannot properly function as the essence of a substance, which means it cannot be an 
attribute.
28
 Or, to use more contemporary terminology, an attribute is a definite 
description, so it must denote only one object. Instead of thinking of God as “an extended 
substance,” the concept of an attribute means we must think of God as “the extended 
substance;” Spinoza’s concept of essence and substance entail this conclusion. Note that 
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this doesn’t mean that each substance can only have one attribute. It just means that one 
attribute is sufficient to pick out a substance.  
 Have we reached the end of objections about Spinoza allocating the attributes to a 
single substance? Unfortunately, nothing in Spinoza scholarship is that simple. As 
witnessed in the previous chapter, I am fond of the concept of one person’s modus ponens 
being another’s modus tollens. In this case, the conditional would be “if there is a 
substance with all attributes, then there cannot exist a substance which consists of a finite 
number of attributes.” Spinoza thinks the antecedent is true, since God contains all 
attributes, meaning there are no substances outside of God. But why couldn’t we simply 
say that the converse is true: there could exist substances which consist of only one 
attribute, so therefore a substance containing any of these attributes in a larger collection 
cannot exist. This would be especially problematic for a substance that supposedly 
contains every possible attribute, which would Spinoza’s proof of God’s existence false. 
And although Descartes would likely be appalled by Spinoza’s definition of God, he 
would say that if we had to choose between many singular substances and one substance 
with many attributes, he’d go with the former option. This comes from his view in the 
Meditations that conceptual distinction entails actual distinction. Thus, the conceptual 
distinction between thought and extension would entail that they belong to fundamentally 
separate beings. Spinoza has an argument for establishing that God needs to exist, but it 
is very weak as it stands in the Ethics. However, with the addition of Letter 12, we can 
construct an argument that’s a bit more convincing.  
 Spinoza’s argument for the existence of God in the ethics occurs at IP11. It’s 
relatively straightforward in its demonstration. God is a substance, and therefore we 
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cannot deny its existence, since substance has a self-caused existence. But why not take 
the following argument: the substance consisting of only one attribute must exist, since 
this thing is defined as a substance and therefore it pertains to its nature to exist. In the 
early propositions of Book 1, Spinoza has only proven that it is the nature of substance to 
exist, but not that a substance of infinite attributes must take precedence over an infinite 
amount of mono-attribute substances. In order to produce the result that no substance can 
exist outside of God, Spinoza needs to show that the antecedent, that God exists, is 
necessarily true in a way that rules out the possibility of there being an any number of 
substances with different attributes, a situation that when combined with the no shared 
attribute doctrine would rule out the existence of God as defined by The Ethics. Only 
after this fact has been established can the no shared attribute doctrine be used to show 
that there is nothing outside of God. 
 In The Ethics, one of the arguments which most clearly relates to this point is also 
one of the more obscure. IP10, the proposition that each attribute must be conceived 
through itself was mentioned above, but the Scholium to this proposition explains that a 
substance can still have more than one attribute despite the need to conceive of each 
attribute independently. Here he states that “the more reality, or being it [substance] has, 
the more it has attributes which express necessity, or eternity, and infinity.” Huenemann 
refers to Spinoza’s Short Treatise to explain this claim.29 In the Short Treatise, an 
analogy is made between modes and the attributes. Just as the extended modes of my 
body, my house, the planet Earth, and all other beings are all united in the attribute of 
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extension, the attribute of extension and thought are like “modes” (loosely speaking) of 
God. That is, just as an infinite number of things are bound under the attribute of 
extension, an infinite number of attributes are similarly bound under the infinite 
substance: which is God. Melamed takes this approach as well, though he is agnostic 
regarding the exact nature of the relationship between attributes/substance. What he does 
stress is that it’s important to acknowledge that the relationship between the attributes 
and substance is similar in structure to the one between the attributes and modes.
30
 Just as 
extended modes emerge from and are dependent upon the attribute of extension, the 
infinite attributes all stem from God as the infinite substance consisting of all possible 
attributes.  
Once again, why must we say that we ought to think of these attributes as all 
united under substance instead of as separate entities? The modes need to be united under 
an attribute since they cannot exist through their own power, but attributes are not subject 
to this requirement. To imagine an attribute is to imagine a substance with that attribute, 
as mentioned above. However, a reason as to why the attributes should be conceived of 
as united can be found in Letter 12.  
 Imagine that there are an infinite number of separate substances with different 
attributes. What kind of infinity would we use to describe this situation? Using the 
taxonomy of Letter 12, this would be the third type of infinity, since it could be 
conceived of greater or less in a metaphysical sense (e.g. all the attributes without 
exception, and all the attributes except for thought). But for Spinoza this type of infinity 
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is extremely weak, not at all suitable for an account of the fundamental ontology of the 
universe. On the other hand, if all the attributes were united in a single substance, there 
would be no collection of independent entities of which to speak, since they are all 
connected under one substance, which is infinite in the highest degree: as a necessary 
unified whole. This is why one substance with all the attributes would be more 
fundamental than any collection of independent substances. Thus substance monism is a 
result of Spinoza’s belief that a unified infinity which exists absolutely is metaphysically 
stronger than any amalgamation of lesser beings.  
Identifying God as presented in The Ethics with the infinite by nature of Letter 12 
is also a move Nadler presents, arguing that there is enough of an overlap between the 
ways that God is described in The Ethics and the properties of the first kind of infinity 
identified in Letter 12. Nadler points out that the first type of infinity is “what medieval 
philosophers referred to as an absolutely infinite being,” by the nature of “infinity” 
meaning “all” in this context.31 Since the first kind of infinity in Letter 12 possesses the 
most perfection of all the types of infinity, for Spinoza a substance with all attributes is a 
more rational account than a world where there is no being to call absolutely infinite.   
Although this may solve the problem of whether a single being with infinite 
attributes can be posited in opposition to a world containing a plurality of substances with 
separate attributes, one problem remains. In Letter 12, that which is infinite by nature can 
admit to no separation without resulting in a loss of coherence. But God contains all 
attributes, which are separate essences. How could God retain this degree of essential 
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infinity while still containing these distinct attributes? To show that this is not a problem 
for Spinoza, I now turn to the nature of the distinctions among substance, and what is 
meant by the term “indivisible” in this context. 
ii. Substance/Attribute Relationship 
 So we face a problem: if God is the infinite collection of attributes, why can’t we 
divide God into different subsets of attributes, thus creating a division (contrary to both 
The Ethics and Letter 12)? One solution is to say that the differences of attributes are 
merely conceptual, being non-actual differences that stem only from our finite intellect. 
In this reading, thought and extension are not really different essences, but are the result 
of the mind seeing the same thing in different ways, and mistakenly concludes that this 
means that there really are differences between extension and thought independently of 
our minds. In reality, according to this view, there is no natural separation between the 
different attributes. One possible defense for this view is that when Spinoza defines 
attributes, he says that they are what “the intellect perceives of a substance, as 
constituting its essence” (IP4). This is different than simply saying that attributes 
constitute the essence of substance, without making any reference to the intellect. 
However, while this may be a possible reading of ID4 itself, other passages in The Ethics 
make this interpretation overwhelmingly implausible.  
First of all, Spinoza argues repeatedly that two substances cannot have the same 
attribute. Although he argues for this based on our inability to mentally distinguish two 
substances via a common attribute, the conclusion he draws is ontological, not 
epistemological. In general, Spinoza tends to argue for features of God based on 
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supposed a priori concepts.
32
 And if our ideas of division in the attributes don’t reflect 
actual divisions in nature, then why does Spinoza use our other ideas of substance as a 
pathway to describing how things truly are? IP2, for instance, uses the fact that if there 
are no conceptual connections between different substances, then they have nothing in 
common. This is a metaphysical conclusion drawn from epistemic premises. And in IP19, 
Spinoza says that all of God’s attributes are eternal. Eternal beings must exist by their 
own necessity, as shown in Letter 12. If attributes are created by the mind, then 
something is required to create these concepts. But if the attributes are just subjective 
concepts, then the mind has to create them at some point, meaning they would not have 
the self-contained existence of eternal objects. For these reasons, among others, the best 
overall interpretation is that the different attributes are the result of objective divisions 
among the attributes. 
 We can now return to the central question: if God is infinite in the first sense, how 
is it that God can have real distinctions, given the way the first kind of infinity is 
presented in Letter 12? The converse is equally problematic: if God is infinite in the first 
sense, how could God possess real divisions? This is especially pressing given IP13, 
which states that “A substance which is absolutely infinite [i.e. God] is indivisible.” After 
all, if thought and extension are separate, with nothing in common, then doesn’t that 
create a division within God, contrary to IP13, and so many of Spinoza’s central claims?  
The solution I propose depends on the definitional distinction between God and 
substance. Once we reach the midpoint of Book I, it is clear that God and Substance are 
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one and the same in nature (essence and existence) but prior to that, substance is talked 
about in general. Using contemporary terminology, substance and God have the same 
extension, but different intensions. For instance, water and H2O refer to the same thing, 
but are different concepts with respect to their intensions. And in The Ethics, a similar 
situation occurs. God and substance are defined separately, and Spinoza has to invoke 
other concepts and arguments to show that the two are identical. Thus, to show how 
division can occur within God, we must to distinguish between dividing God and 
retaining the defined nature of substance, and dividing God and retaining the defined 
properties of God. 
 As mentioned previously, God is defined as “a substance consisting of infinite 
attributes,” and substance is defined as “what is in itself and conceived through itself” 
(ID6 and ID3). Through later developments in The Ethics, these two definitions are 
shown to necessarily correspond to the same being, but substance is actually a “wider” 
concept when considered in itself. All that is required for a substance is a necessary (self-
caused) existence, which is manifested through some attribute. Thus to conceive of God 
through attribute A is to conceive of a substance consisting of attribute A. Have we 
divided our concept of God? We have taken one of God’s attributes and then conceived 
of a new being with no intrinsic contradictions. Obviously, this new substance cannot 
exist independently, given Spinoza’s arguments for substance monism. However, when 
considered in itself, there is nothing incoherent about this concept. Dividing God’s 
attributes into separate substances therefore does not lead to an internal inconsistency, 
like a square circle, but it is a possibility which is ruled out by other necessary and a 
priori facts about the world. Once we have done this division, we have annihilated our 
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concept of God, as we are now considering a substance which does not possess every 
attribute but only one, which contradicts the defined nature of God. So, if by division, we 
simply mean that we can take one of God’s attributes and conceive the properties of that 
attribute and its modes in isolation, then God is divisible, as Spinoza himself suggests in 
the early parts of Book II. But, if we mean that God can actually be divided into two 
separately existing parts and retain the nature of God (like how macroscopic matter can 
be actually divided and both parts will still retain the nature of matter), then God cannot 
be divided.  
Thus, my reading of IP13, which states that “A substance which is absolutely 
infinite [i.e. God] is indivisible,” is that we can perceive the distinct attributes of God, but 
we cannot state that we have found new substances which consist of those different 
attributes. To use an imperfect analogy, we can recognize the distinct blocks in a Jenga 
tower with many blocks removed, while being unable to remove any of the blocks and 
form a separate tower without the whole structure collapsing. Or to use another example, 
the type of division which is forbidden isn’t imagining the top half and lower half of a 
piece of paper geometrically, it’s actually ripping them apart. Thus, to say that God is 
indivisible doesn’t mean that distinct attributes cannot be identified. It means that once 
those attributes are considered, it does not follow that these attributes can be separated 
into new substances. In this sense the relationship between substance and attributes is that 
attributes do form distinct properties within God, but cannot be given a separate existence 
independent of God, as proven in Book I of the Ethics. 
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iii. How Many Attributes are There? 
 So far, we have seen there is one substance, with infinite attributes, and it cannot 
be divided into separate substances, through an actual seperation. But what exactly does 
“infinite attributes” mean? Does it mean that there are a finite number of attributes, each 
of which is infinite, or does it mean that there are an infinite number of them? So far the 
second answer has been assumed, but there are compelling arguments for the former 
which deserve attention. Additionally, why is it that of the infinite collection of attributes, 
we are only capable of conceiving of two of them, as Spinoza admits in IIA5? This is an 
axiom that states “we neither feel nor perceive any singular things, except bodies and 
modes of thinking.” 
 One way to resolve this issue is to consider, once again, at the definition of God. 
Spinoza adds a note to this definition explaining what he means by absolutely infinite: “if 
something is absolutely infinite, whatever expresses essence and involves no negation 
pertains to its essence.” To use a mathematical analogy, the set of all integers may be 
infinite in kind, since there are no integers which fall outside of its scope. However, this 
set is not absolutely infinite, since there are numbers in the mathematical universe which 
are not contained within this set.
33
 This still doesn’t answer the question of how many 
attributes there are, since without any clue as to what the other attributes could be, it’s 
entirely possible that there are no attributes other than thought and extension. If every 
attempt to construct properties other than the two which are always given result in a 
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contradiction, then two is the maximum amount of attributes there can be. That would 
mean that it is possible for “absolutely infinite” to mean two, but only if those two are the 
only things which “expresses essence and involve no negation,” the criteria which make 
God an absolutely infinite being. The best solution to this problem would be to give an 
example of an additional attribute, or, better yet, a set of guidelines for identifying new 
attributes.  
But Spinoza doesn’t even hint towards any of these solutions, although he repeats 
his insistence that we can only know two of God’s attributes in Letter 64. He says in 
response to G.H. Schuller that “the human mind – i.e., the idea of the human body – 
involves and expresses no other attributes of God except these two [thought and 
extension].”34 Therefore, the best evidence we have to support an answer to the question 
of whether or not there are more than just two attributes is plausibility. If the two 
mentioned attributes were the only existing attributes, we lose potential diversity within 
God, but now we have an understanding of God that’s stronger than “a being of infinite 
attributes,” since we can list the attributes under consideration. On the other hand, a God 
of with an infinite amount of attributes would have more essences united under it than an 
account where God has just two attributes, but we cannot come close to comprehending, 
or even naming, the basic essences of God. If we can explanation the gap that emerges 
between the epistemology and the metaphysics of this latter account, it gives a more 
tenable alternative to the scenario where God has just two attributes. Recently, Melamed 
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has offered a convincing account, and I will expand upon it in the remainder of the 
chapter. 
 One way to think about the attributes is that the essence they correspond to 
constitute that attribute’s basic “job.” So the job of extension as an attribute is to possess 
geometric distance relations, and the job of the intellect as an attribute is to represent 
modes in the other attributes. This leads to an imbalance in the importance of intellect 
compared with the other attributes. In this account, the strict separation between the 
attributes remains, since none require the fundamental natures of any other attribute in 
their essences. And since the intellect has the job of representation, it reflects the features 
of all of the other modes. As mentioned before, the mind and body are parallels of each 
other, and our experience of our mind, just is a representation of those modes (IIP13). 
Now let’s introduce a different mode, a correlate of my body, but under attribute X, 
whatever that may be. Since intellect’s essence seems to involve representing other 
modes, there will be a reflection of this mode of Attribute X in the intellect, just as my 
body as an extended being is represented as such under the intellect.
35
 But there are also 
ideas representing all the other attributes, so why doesn’t my mind have ideas of those? 
Melamed’s answer is that each mode in the intellect has a complex internal structure, like 
a multifaceted gem (but with infinite sides). In Melamed’s own words, “each idea has 
infinitely many aspects, so that each idea-aspect uniquely represents a mode of God 
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under a particular attribute.”36 And each of these facets are just as isolated from each 
other as the differing attributes they reflect. Put more concretely (or at least as concrete as 
one can be in the realm of abstract metaphysics), my mind is the representation of my 
body and all the other extended things which interact with it. And my body is only 
affected by other extended modes, neither X modes, Y modes, nor any the other modes 
which belong to the attributes other than thought and extension. The reason why we can’t 
conceive of any of these mysterious attributes is because the intellect reflects the causal 
and relational orders in nature, and without any causal bridges between the attributes, 
there is no mapping between the attributes in the intellect. And thus, we cannot conceive 
of them. A textual justification for this comes from IIP26, which states that “The mind 
does not perceive any external body as actually existing, except through the ideas of the 
affections of its own body.” In other words, our ideas are just parallels of things acting on 
our bodies. And with no modes from other attributes acting on our bodies, our minds 
cannot form perceptions of them (although there will necessarily be minds in the intellect 
that do form perceptions of them, but not extension or any other attribute). Since ID4 
states that the attributes are what “the intellect perceives of a substance, as constituting its 
essence,” without anything from another attribute to affect our bodies, “the mind does not 
perceive” these attributes. 
Melamed’s interpretation is that there are actually two parts of IIP7. First, there is 
the claim that all ideas reflect things in the universe. This is the main proof of IIP7, which 
states “the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of 
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things.” Melamed’s reading tells us that all we can infer from this statement is that for 
each thing, there is a mirror idea of that thing in the intellect. But this statement is not a 
two-way street. There could be two separate orders of things in attributes X and Y, and 
there would be a parallel structure of the ideas of those things in the intellect. But this 
does not entail that there has to be a universal structure across all of the attributes. In 
other words, for any attribute, there exists some part of the intellect which has the same 
structure of that attribute. But it’s still possible that there are structures in the intellect 
which only have a counterpart in one attribute, but not another. For instance, it could be 
that my extended body is mirrored in the intellect, but not any other attribute. IIP7 only 
states that for any attribute, something exists in the intellect whose structure is 
isomorphic to that attribute’s modes. But this does not entail that everything must share a 
similar structure across the attributes. This is why the claim that there is a universal order 
and connection across every attribute requires an additional premise. 
Melamed points out that this second premise comes from Spinoza’s scholium to 
IIP7, which contains the phrase: “whether we conceive of nature under the attribute of 
extension, or under the attribute of thought, or under another attribute, we shall find one 
and the same order.” According to Melamed, “E2P7 asserts a parallelism between two 
domains of entities (ideas and things), while E2P7S asserts a parallelism between 
infinitely many domains (the infinitely many attributes).”37 The scholium claims that in 
the Spinozistic universe every set of causes and effects under one attribute has an 
isomorphism in every other attribute. While this second doctrine presents a view of a 
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universe which involves beautifully complex parallels between all of the attributes, it 
stretches too far beyond the propositions and axioms Spinoza presents. The only thing we 
can infer from IIP7 itself, (which only relies on IA4) is that modes outside of the intellect 
have a reflection within the intellect, not that there is a similar order and connection 
among the non-intellect attributes. But this leads us to the modes, and not attributes, 
which are the focus of this chapter. What’s important here is that the existence of other 
attributes can be accounted for by the lack of causal interaction between any of the modes 
of different attributes. 
In this chapter, I took the concept of infinite by nature present in Letter 12 and 
showed how its properties can be applied to God and its attributes in the context of The 
Ethics. Despite being distinct entities, the attributes are not separable from God in the 
ways that produce independently existing objects. Additionally, a possible answer was 
given to why God’s other attributes are both unknown and unknowable to us as mind 
which are ideas of bodies. The next step is to address the next rung on the ladder of 
infinite categories, that which is infinite by cause. 
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Chapter 3: Infinite by Cause: Big, But not Everything 
 The next level of infinity to examine is “infinite by virtue of the cause in which 
they inhere; and when the latter [this kind of infinity] are conceived in abstraction, they 
can be divided into parts and regarded as finite.”38 This is the type of infinity which 
corresponds to the world of modes. As mentioned in the first chapter, modes describe the 
objects of everyday experiences. In this level, nothing is intrinsically necessary, which 
means that everything depends on the existence of other things, whether substance itself 
or other modes. Once the whole causal chain is put forth, everything becomes necessary, 
but in themselves, the essences of modes don’t involve existence. It is only once we 
consider the order of nature that we can determine whether or not a mode exists. This is 
what Spinoza proves in propositions 24-29 of Book I. IP29 is “In nature there is nothing 
contingent, but all things have been determined from the very necessity of the divine 
nature to exist and produce an effect in a certain way.” The proof of that is the following: 
Whatever is, is in God (by P15); but God cannot be called a contingent thing. For 
(by P11) he exists necessarily, not contingently. Next, the modes of the divine 
nature have also followed from it necessarily and not contingently (by P16) - 
either insofar as the divine nature is considered to act in a certain way (by P28). 
Further, God is the cause of these modes not only insofar as they simply exist (by 
P24C), but also (by P26) insofar as it is impossible, not contingent, that they 
should determine themselves. Conversely (by P27) if they have been determined 
by God, it is not contingent, but impossible, that they should render themselves 
undetermined. So all things have been determined from the necessity of the divine 
nature, not only to exist, but to exist in a certain way, and to produce effects in a 
certain way. There is nothing contingent. q.e.d. 
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Besides giving an insight into how confusing Spinoza’s writing style can be at times, this 
passage shows that even though the existence of a specific thing, like my chair, may not 
be a self-caused and intrinsically necessary being, it is a part of a causal ordering whose 
necessity follows from God when conceived as a substance. This chapter will focus on 
the relationship between the infinitely many modes and the one substance, and relevant to 
this paper is the fact that duration goes backwards infinitely for Spinoza, making this 
causal chain infinite. Specifically, the two major topics will be how the infinite sequence 
of modes are entailed by timeless and unchanging infinite substance, and whether or not 
it is necessary that every attribute have the same order and connection with respect to 
their modes. 
i. From the Infinite Universe to the Closed World 
 The first kinds of things that directly follow from the nature of an attribute are the 
infinite modes. These strange types of mode are introduced in IP21, where Spinoza 
describes “things which follow from the absolute nature of any of God’s attributes.” 
Spinoza argues through a proof by contradiction that these modes must be infinite. For if 
they were finite, then they would have to be limited by something (which is what ID2 
asserts about the nature of finitude). But we’re talking about the first mode to be entailed 
by an attribute, so there are no modes out there to limit it yet. And if we say that it has a 
finite duration, that too would have to be limited by some other mode destroying it. Since 
these modes follow directly from the eternal substance, there is nothing which could 
possibly limit it. Thus, they are infinite, but in the sense which belongs to modes, not 
substances, since they are not self-caused. Unlike the attributes, the infinite modes do not 
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constitute the essence of a substance, and since they cannot be conceived as constituting 
the essence of a substance, they are not an essential feature of the attributes.  
Additionally, we can classify the infinite modes into two separate categories, 
those which follow directly from an attribute, and those which follow from another 
infinite mode. In Letter 64, Spinoza gives two examples of the first kind of infinite mode, 
also known as an immediate infinite mode. In the case of thought, we have an infinite 
intellect (which is called “The idea of God” in The Ethics), and in the case of extension, 
we have “motion and rest”. And an example of an infinite mode which follows from 
another infinite mode, which are sometimes called mediate infinite modes, is “the face of 
the whole universe.”39 This statement can be seen as the first test of trans-attribute 
parallelism, a test that I could not find addressed in the literature. For if the order and 
connection of thought and extension really are the same, then the immediate infinite 
modes of both attributes must serve the same function in the overall structure of their 
respective modes. What this means is that the causal role that an infinite intellect plays in 
the attribute of thought must be isomorphic to the causal role that motion and rest plays in 
extension. In order for Spinoza’s structural parallelism to hold, there must then be some 
commonality between an infinite intellect and motion and rest. 
 The best answer to the question of how motion and rest can serve the same the 
same function as an infinite intellect comes from Spinoza’s definition of an individual in 
the “physical interlude” of Book II. Here, an individual thing is defined as the 
continuation of certain proportions of motion and rest (IIP13S). Using this principle of 
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individuation, we can apply a similarity between the seemingly separate concepts of 
motion and rest and an infinite intellect, since every idea of a physical individual will be 
an idea of a certain proportions of motion and rest. Therefore, bare motion and rest has 
the ability to produce all of the things which can fall under the infinite intellect, allowing 
us to say that they are parallel concepts. Despite the success in explaining how these two 
concepts can parallel each other, we still need to say how the infinite modes follow from 
substance, as well as how finite modes follow from infinite modes. 
 The main problem with understanding how infinite modes lead to finite modes 
comes straight from Spinoza’s text. IP22 asserts that what follows from an infinite mode 
necessarily must be infinite. This seems to imply that there can be no step at which an 
infinite mode entails that a finite mode follows. In Friedman’s analysis of this issue, he 
argues that Spinoza has two separate accounts of necessary entailment. The first is a 
definitional type of necessity and can be done in a finite number of steps. For instance, it 
is necessary that, in Euclidean space, a triangle’s angles will add to 180 degrees.40 And it 
is necessary that given my essence, I am a human and not a goat. But if we were to ask 
why I exist, we need to look at the order and cause of nature, a point which has been 
made repeatedly throughout this thesis. And though it is necessary that given the state of 
the world, I came into being, the analysis of this necessity is different than reasoning with 
essences and definitions. This is because definitional reasoning about things other than 
God can only get us “if-then” reasoning about necessary properties. 
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If I exist, we can conclude that it will be necessary that I am a human being. But 
to see why it is necessary that I exist, an infinite regress into the order and connection of 
causes and effects must be performed, an impossible task for finite minds. So in one 
sense, necessity can describe why something is the way it is (its essence), and in another 
it answers why something is (its existence).
41
  
For Spinoza, the essences of finite things give us truths about what is analytically 
necessary, but causal necessity comes from external facts. The distinction between these 
two types of necessity leads Friedman to conclude that Spinoza might not be as strict of a 
necessitarian as is often assumed, since he allows the possibility of the world being 
ordered differently, by ignoring other facts about how modes follow from other 
modes/substance. A world with different events would violate the causal structure of this 
world, but a world with a different causal structure would be a coherent idea that doesn’t 
cause contradictions, according to Friedman. This analysis may seem tangential to the 
question of how the finite follows from the infinite, but for Friedman, it is the bedrock of 
his analysis. If we look for some definitional aspect of substance which leads to the 
intrinsic necessity of the world of finite things, we’ll find no answer. Instead, the type of 
necessity with which the finite follows from the infinite is causal in nature, meaning that 
the question of how the world of our experience follows from the unchanging eternal 
essence of substance has to be analytical, not causal. When explaining this point, 
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Friedman even goes as far as to say that Leibniz’s doctrine of possible worlds might be 
compatible with a Spinozistic system.
42
  
One virtue of this reading is that it allows us to distinguish the differences 
between an infinite intellect, and the face of the universe, the first two infinite modes of 
thought. An infinite intellect would comprehend all of the formal essences of things. 
Formal essences are mentioned in IIP5, which states that the formal essences of things 
have God as their cause, as well as IIP8, which deals with the nature of non-existent 
things. For Spinoza, when considered formally, the essential properties of finite things 
which actually exist and those which don’t are the same; it’s the order and connection of 
nature which determine whether or not any finite thing is actualized. Therefore, the 
absolutely infinite intellect (as well as motion and rest for extension) involves every 
formal essence and all the ways that they could relate to one another in possible 
configurations of the world. And the first mediate infinite mode, the “face of the whole 
universe,” is the infinite mode which corresponds to the arrangement of all of the finite 
modes in the actual world.  
The problem that this picture faces compared to Leibniz’s is that unlike Leibniz, 
Spinoza doesn’t believe in a God who chooses which possibility to actualize. For 
Leibniz, God could create any possible world, but chooses to create the best, due to 
God’s beneficence. But Spinoza sees the practice of assigning teleological purposes to 
God’s actions as an unnecessary and unproductive error, as he repeatedly asserts in the 
Appendix to Book I of The Ethics. Unlike Leibniz, this cosmological question of why any 
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one particular universe is chosen from a group of equally logically consistent universes 
remains a mystery. In other words, if we admit a plurality of logically possible orderings, 
what is the process which gets us the actual ordering of the finite modes?  
By breaking Spinoza’s account of necessity into two categories (logical and 
causal), Friedman has inadvertently introduced a new level of complexity into the 
problem of how finite modes follow from infinite modes. His interpretation may fall 
within the text of Spinoza’s work, but by the strict necessity of definition from the 
specific ordering and connection of this world, he has opened a gap between the 
unlimited logical possibilities thought of in the infinite intellect, and the reality of the 
face of the whole universe. However, both the immediate and the mediate modes are 
infinite by cause, despite the fact that the “face of the universe” doesn’t have the 
indivisible infinity of substance, since we could imagine this part of the universe, or just 
one of the formal essences comprehended by the infinite intellect. Because we can 
conceive of parts of these modes, they are infinite in a way that permits divisibility, 
which makes them distinct from the infinity which applies to substance. 
 The division between definitional necessity and causal necessity can be grounded 
by the propositions of The Ethics. In IP11 and IP17S Spinoza uses the example of a 
triangle and its necessary properties to show the difference between something which is 
intrinsically necessary, and something which necessary as a result of external forces: 
This reason, or cause, [for a thing’s existence] must either be contained in the 
nature of the thing, or outside it. For example, the very nature of a square circle 
indicates the reason why it does not exist, namely, because it involves a 
contradiction. On the other hand, the reason why a substance exists also follows 
from its nature alone, but it involves existence (see P7). But the reason why a 
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circle or triangle exists, or why it does not exist, does not follow from the nature 
of these things, but from the order of the whole of corporeal Nature. For from this 
[order] it must follow either that the triangle necessarily exists now or that it is 
impossible for it to exist now. (IP11). 
Continuing with the triangle theme, Spinoza asserts in a discussion of God’s lack of free 
will that: 
Others think that God is a free cause because he can (so they think) bring it about 
that the things which we have said follow from his nature (i.e., which are in his 
power) do not happen or are not produced by him. But this is the same as if they 
were to say that God can bring it about that it would not follow from the nature of 
a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles; or that from a given 
cause the effect would not follow - which is absurd. (IP17S) 
What Spinoza is saying here is that if a triangle were to exist, the interior sum theorem 
would necessarily hold.
43
 This is different than saying that it is necessary that a triangle 
with 180 degrees exists. It just says that if one did exist, there is nothing that can stop it 
from following that a geometric analysis will show that its interior angles add up to 180 
degrees. And for Spinoza, only substance’s existence is a necessary consequence of its 
definition. 
In the case of modes (both finite and infinite), essential properties tell us that if 
they exist, they’ll have certain properties, but whether or not they actually exist is an 
open question to be filled by the order and connection of nature. This is what IA7 tells us 
about finite things: “If a thing can be conceived as not existing, its essence does not 
involve existence.” Since we can conceive of a different ordering of things in the world, 
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the ordering of things in this world is not intrinsically necessary, but must be determined 
by a fact stemming from one of the self-determined parts of nature, i.e. God.  
God directly determines the immediate infinite modes of infinite intellect/motion 
and rest/whatever the infinite modes of the other attributes are, and then they cause a 
chain reaction of entailments which leads to the existence of finite things. This is what 
Spinoza claims in IP28 and 29, where he says that no finite mode is determined to exist 
by intrinsic necessity, but at the same time, nothing in nature is undetermined.  
The problem is that it doesn’t seem like there’s any specific fact in the immediate 
infinite modes, the ones which are about every possible configuration of finite modes that 
cause nature to have the structure that it does. For these reasons there don’t seem to be 
any guiding principles that can give a coherent account of why there’s a necessary 
relation between the possible connections of formal essences and the actual connections 
of instantiated modes. Once the laws of physics and ordering of modes are set, then 
everything else follows by causal necessity. But there doesn’t seem to be any necessary 
reason why of all the infinite possibilities for physical laws and events, only one specific 
one occurs. Thus, rather than solving the problem of how the finite follows from the 
infinite, the nature of the immediate infinite modes actual complicates this question by 
opening the door to a plethora of unrealized possibilities. 
ii. Parallelism: Orders and Connections 
Let’s review the parallelism doctrine once more. Spinoza states that the order and 
connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things, meaning that the 
physical world and the idea of that world have one and the same structure, despite the 
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fact that no causal interactions exist between the attributes. This lack of causality was 
previously used to explain why we can form no ideas of other attributes. Ideas are 
representations of something, and without a link between other attributes: there is no 
physical structure which can form the idea of these other attributes in our minds. 
However, this chapter will explore a possible gap in Spinoza’s claim that there is a single 
order that exists across all of the attributes. Although I agree that in Spinoza’s world, it 
follows that there are mappings from the structure of things onto the structure of ideas, I 
don’t think that this is a conclusion he can give without bringing in results that go what 
can be established by his previous work. Spinoza does claim in the scholium to IIP7 that 
we will find the same order and connection in each attribute, but I believe that this is an 
ad hoc addition which isn’t justified by any other parts of The Ethics. 
 The first place to start with this analysis is to once again look at IIP7. This 
proposition is simply that “the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and 
connection of things.” Its demonstration is: 
This is clear from IA4. For the idea of each thing caused depends on the 
knowledge of the cause of which it is the effect. (IIP7) 
 And IA4 simply states that “the knowledge of an effect depends on, and involves, the 
knowledge of the cause.” How IA4 and the concept of order and connection are related is 
not as immediately obvious as Spinoza seems to think. The best explanation for how 
these two passages are related comes from the fact that it is assumed that knowledge of 
an external world exists. And since knowledge the knowledge of an effect involves 
knowledge of a cause, knowledge of the world as it currently exists can only come about 
from world as it once was. And that past can’t be known unless its past is also known, 
and so on. And because of Spinoza’s strict necessitarianism about the relation between 
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causes and effects, the future is derivable from the state of affairs that exists in the 
present. So this knowledge will have the same structure as the universe, since it involves 
knowing causes and effects, while the structure of the physical world consists of those 
same causes and effects. For instance, the book on my table as an extended mode has 
other extended modes involved in the causes leading to its creation and its placement in 
its current position. And the knowledge of all of those things in the intellect will be 
structured in the same way, since to understand an object, Spinoza says we need to 
understand its causes. The fact that knowledge depends on a combination of both effects 
and causes leads the ideas of the world to mirror the way that the world is. Of course, full 
knowledge of all causes and effects is beyond the scope of our finite minds. In this case, 
trying to form ideas without the full scope is what leads to erroneous judgments, meaning 
that we make mistakes through a lack of knowledge, not through any positive ideas 
(IIP33 & IIP35).
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 In this mirroring relationship, Spinoza gives primacy to thought. The first instance 
of this is simply that he gives an account of the infinite idea (as a mode, not an attribute) 
of God in Book II before he gives an account of God’s infinite extension. In this unique 
idea of God, Spinoza claims that an infinite number of things follow in an infinite way 
(IIP3). In this case, infinite once again means “all possible,” so from the idea of God, 
every possible object and relation between objects follows in some formal way. However, 
what does Spinoza mean by the idea of God? Is it an idea belonging to God, an idea with 
God as its focus, or is it God’s mind? The answer is technically all three. The idea 
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belongs to God, since it is a mode which exists within God. But so is every other idea, a 
fact which Spinoza proved in IP15, and which has been mentioned previously. Whatever 
the idea of God is, it, like everything else, is within God. But more importantly, this is an 
idea of God in the sense that it is about God, since it is “an idea, both of his essence and 
of everything which necessarily follows from his essence” (IIP3). In other words, the 
objects of this idea are all of the attributes (God’s essence) and all of the modes which 
reside within those attributes (everything which necessarily follows from God’s essence). 
It is also God’s mind, since it contains every essential property of substance, as well as 
the essences of the modes. This makes it the mind of God, since there is nothing outside 
of substance, attributes, and modes in the universe, meaning that an intellect which 
understands all these things will understand everything there is to know in Spinoza’s 
account of ontology. And as an omniscient being, Spinoza’s God has a mind which thinks 
all of these things, and nothing more, making the idea of God understood as an absolutely 
infinite intellect the mind of God as well. 
However, the properties of God’s mind make a balanced parallelism untenable. 
The idea of God involves comprehending every one of God’s essences/attributes, as well 
as an additional infinite hierarchy. For each idea, there is an idea of that idea. And there is 
an idea of that idea of that idea, all the way to infinity (IIP21). However, is not an exact 
parallel of this structure in the attribute of extension. The closest we can get is the 
essence of extension and a formal collection of all extended modes, but we won’t find the 
essence of the intellect or any other attribute in this infinite mode. Additionally, if we 
have a body, there won’t be a body of that body, like there is an idea of an idea. And in 
attribute X, whatever that may be, we can have the essence of X, and a collection of all 
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the X modes, but no infinite hierarchy like in the intellect. Therefore, the idea of God 
cannot have a parallel in the “body” of God, since the idea of God involves a concept of 
extension and ideas about those ideas, but extension doesn’t have an analogue which 
captures this reasoning. Thus, the intellect plays a privileged role among the attributes, 
since its modes can relate to any other attribute, as well as other modes within the 
intellect in a unique hierarchy, while the modes of other attributes do not have this 
reflexive power. 
I called the theory which is untenable in light of this argument one where there is 
a balanced parallelism for a reason. We could say that there is an unbalanced parallelism 
among the attributes. In this account, the intellect’s essence of representing the other 
attributes is an essence which means that although both collections are infinite in their 
own kind, the collection of all of the modes of the intellect is greater than the collection 
of all the modes of any other attribute. This is because the intellect will contain an idea of 
all of the modes of the other attribute, plus the ideas of those ideas. But we could say that 
something similar remains among all of these essences and modes: structural relations. 
This is what Spinoza says in the Scholium to IIP7: 
A circle existing in Nature and the idea of the existing circle, which is also in 
God, are one and the same thing, which is explained through different attributes. 
Therefore, whether we conceive Nature under the attribute of extension, or under 
the attribute of thought, or under any other attribute, we shall find one and the 
same order, or one and the same connection of causes, that is, the same things 
follow from one another. 
When I said [NS: before] that God is the cause of the idea, say of a circle, only 
insofar as he is a thinking thing, and [the cause] of the circle, only insofar as he is 
an extended thing, this was for no other reason than because the formal being of 
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the idea of the circle can be perceived only through another mode of thinking, as 
its proximate cause, and that mode again through another, and so on, to infinity. 
Hence, so long as things are considered as modes of thinking, we must explain the 
order of the whole of Nature, or the connection of causes, through the attribute of 
thought alone. And insofar as they are considered as modes of extension, the 
order of the whole of Nature must be explained through the attributes of extension 
alone. I understand the same concerning the other attributes. (IIP7S). 
In this account, not only is it true that for any structure in an attribute, there exists a 
similar structure within the intellect, but it tells us that for any attribute, every other 
attribute shares the exact same order and connection. For instance, the mode of intellect 
which has my extended body as its subject will relate to the mode of the idea of my shoes 
in the same way that my actual body relates to my actual shoes. And if structure is the 
same across all the modes, there is some mode under attribute X which relates to some 
other mode in that same attribute which relate to one another in the same way that my 
body and shoes are linked in physical space. And of course, there will be an idea of this 
relation of these X modes as well. And in this theory, there will be objects which are 
similarly related to one another under every other attribute.  
Although this account is different than how Melamed constructs his infinitely-
faceted modes of the intellect, a similar picture emerges when considering the idea of my 
body as extended and the idea of my body under attribute X as two separate modes. 
Melamed would say that the parallel of my body would have just one mode in the 
intellect, but with an infinite number of “idea aspects” constructing the mode of thought, 
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where every aspect is a representation of a given mode under each different attribute.
45
 
Instead of postulating idea aspects to account for the ideas of modes under different 
attributes, we can combine the idea of my body and all of the ideas of its analogues in 
other attributes into a collection of modes, and do the same for all of the other sets of 
related modes. Instead of talking about a single mode with an infinite number of facets 
which represent all of the different attributes that share similar orders and connections, 
we say that we’re talking sets which have an infinite number of modes as elements, with 
each set containing every representation of a mode and its parallels as an element (ex. the 
idea of a as an extended thing, the idea of a as something under attribute X, the idea of a 
as a mode of attribute Y, and so on). Each set, as well as the collection of all of these sets 
represents something which is infinite by cause. Each one possesses an infinite number of 
elements, but we can divide these sets into their constituent modes of the intellect, 
without a contradiction. 
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Fig. 4 
An example of sets of ideas of things under different 
attributes, where I(x) simply means the idea of x. 
According to IIP7, although each collection will contain an 
infinite number of different modes, the elements of one 
group will relate to the corresponding elements of another 
group in a similar way (represented by the lines). 
 
These infinite collections of the modes of intellect fit well within the account 
Spinoza gives of infinity in Letter 12. None of these collections have the self-caused 
existence of substance, but they’re still larger than any finite number could account for. 
Additionally, we can divide these collections into finite parts without getting a 
contradiction, since the finite parts would just be collections of finite modes. And if 
something was logically incoherent about collections of finite modes, we would be in 
trouble, since that would jeopardize most of our everyday reasoning about objects. Since 
I cannot draw an infinite number of things, Figure 4 is not a full drawing of what these 
infinite collections in the intellect would look like, but it is a finite approximation. All the 
ideas of my body under the infinitely many attributes could be put into one set, and all of 
the ideas of my glasses can be placed into separate groups. And the connection between 
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the ideas of my body and glasses under the extension will be the same as the actual 
connection between my body and glasses in extension. This connection will also be the 
same as the one between the idea of my body and glasses under attribute X, which is the 
same as the actual modes under attribute X. And adding the ideas of ideas, we get 
something like Figure 5. Here, the ideas of objects are connected to each other, and the 
ideas of ideas connect both to ideas and other ideas of ideas. And even though they aren’t 
on the graph, there will be an infinite number of ideas of things, an infinite number of 
ideas of ideas, and an infinite hierarchy of ideas of ideas of ideas…  
 
Fig. 5. 
The order and connection of ideas, as well as ideas of ideas. 
 
However, this picture does not necessarily emerge if we ignore the scholium to 
IIP7. If we just look at the proposition itself, all we have is that the order of ideas (of X) 
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is the same as the order and connection of things (modes of X), where X is the attribute in 
question. Thus, it would be possible that the idea of my body and glasses under extension 
relate to one another as the actual extended modes, yet it could still be possible for my 
body under attribute X to relate to my glasses under attribute X in a completely different 
way. It is only through the scholium that we get one universal order and connection. 
However, the scholium which asserts a single structure across the modes of every 
attributes does not cite any previous propositions, definitions, or axioms. Therefore, we 
can say that although it isn’t what Spinoza intended, if we can show that the negation of a 
universal structure is consistent with the rest of Spinoza’s system, then it will be a feature 
that’s independent of the rest of The Ethics. 
 The reason why order and connection doesn’t have to be preserved is rather 
simple. If we imagine a diagram of the modes of intellect, we can group them by the 
attributes which contain the modes they represent. So, there would be a cluster of all of 
the ideas of extended modes, and a cluster of all the modes of attribute X, the cluster of 
Y-modes, and so on (Fig. 6). Since Spinoza has a strong prohibition against cross-
attribute causality, there would be no causal connections between any of these clusters, 
making them disjoint subgraphs, to use a more modern concept.
46
 The order and 
connection of any of these components will be identical to the order and connection of 
one of the attributes. This is because of IA4, mentioned above, which is given for the 
justification of the parallelism doctrine. Since knowledge of an effect involves (and 
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requires) knowledge of its cause, the collections of any ideas will share the same order 
and connection as the things themselves. And vacuously, if we select a group of things 
with no connections (i.e. they come from two separate attributes), then there will be no 
connection between the ideas of each of those objects. This is what we can determine 
with certainty, given Spinoza’s previous definitions and axioms.  
If we introduce the negation of the universal parallelism asserted in IIP7S, we get 
something like Figure 6. Here each mode of the intellect corresponds to a mode under 
one of the outer attributes. And for any attribute, the order of its modes is represented by 
one of the clusters within the intellect, meaning there is no contradiction with IP4. In fact, 
I can see no contradiction with the rest of Spinoza’s system when introducing this 
possibility. Since The Ethics is consistent with either the theory that there is a parallelism 
across the attributes or the interpretation that the modes of each attributes have different 
structures, this fact is independent of the derivations given about Spinoza’s world on the 
level of modes.
47
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Fig. 6. The circle is the attribute of thought, and I(E(a)) 
represents the idea of mode a under extension. And I(X(a)) 
means the idea of a under attribute X. Here, each mode 
under every attribute is represented in the intellect, but with 
a different order and connection. 
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Chapter IV. Spinoza’s Legacy: An Overview 
 In this final section, I explore Spinoza’s intellectual legacy, as it pertains to 
theories of infinity. Spinoza’s views on the infinite were highly complex and deeply 
rooted in his view of God and nature. When evaluating his thinking on the infinite, we 
can do so in two ways. One is to ask how well this concept fits with his overall 
philosophical system. Obviously, this analysis has been conducted in the previous 
chapters. Another way to show the quality of Spinoza’s thought is to show that he 
influenced later generations of philosophers in a positive way. This means showing that 
he impacted their thought in ways stronger than simply showing what not to do. In 
particular, I focus first on one of Spinoza’s contemporaries, Gottfried Leibniz, and show 
how his thinking on infinity was influenced by Spinoza. I then discuss Georg Cantor, an 
influential mathematician who worked more than 200 years after Spinoza. Even though 
Cantor revolutionized the way we conceive of infinity inside of mathematics, there is 
ample evidence that he was influenced by Spinoza’s arguments that an actual infinity was 
present in nature, even though Spinoza did not think these types of infinity could be 
assigned a proper number.  
 Historically, interpretations of Spinoza’s philosophy have fluctuated between 
extremes. During his life, critics accused his view of God as collapsing into the natural 
world, making him an atheist. However, during the 19th Century, readers viewed Spinoza 
as offering weak criteria which divided the finite from the infinite, causing the natural 
world to collapse into God, which is why Hegel said that Spinoza’s system contained 
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“too much God.”48 In my opinion, those who see Spinoza as replacing God with nature 
ignore the fact that Spinoza reserved a special kind of infinity just for God, one which 
cannot be defined by all of the finite objects in nature. On the other hand, interpretations 
which deny reality to the world of finite modes rest on the mistake that although Spinoza 
placed God as the foundation of his metaphysical system, modes really do exist, making 
the diversity in the world more than just an illusion. As is often the case, the best 
interpretation likely lies somewhere in the middle between these two extremes. Melamed 
points out, even though Spinoza’s criteria for individuation are relatively weak, there 
isn’t strong enough evidence to think that he intended to restore a Parmenidean view of a 
static and unchanging universe. In fact, Melamed reminds us that Spinoza had not one, 
but two different ways we can differentiate between finite beings in nature. Melamed 
says the presence of two different accounts of differentiation “might indicate that Spinoza 
was still experimenting with various ways to cut nature at its joints. Alternatively, it may 
well be the case that Spinoza intentionally designed the building blocks of his finite 
world as fuzzy units, in order to stress their inferiority to the self-subsisting, self-
explaining, and well-defined substance.”49 Regardless of how we want to classify the 
exact relationship between how the infinite leads to actual finite beings, there is ample 
evidence that Spinoza intended for some type of criterion to serve this purpose. 
I previously mentioned that Leibniz and Cantor will be the focus of this chapter. 
The reason for choosing these two is that both used philosophical arguments to argue that 
an actual infinite exists in nature, while resisting the idea that infinity jeopardizes 
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diversity or minimizes the role of God as creator. Thus these two thinkers used Spinoza’s 
philosophy of the infinite to walk the path between atheism and “acosmism” (the denial 
of the physical world).  
i. Leibniz: Infinite Monads 
 During his life, Leibniz criticized many of Spinoza’s ideas. No doubt there was 
considerable political pressure to distance himself from Spinoza, given Spinoza’s label as 
a dangerous radical. Despite his unwillingness to publicly associate himself with 
Spinoza’s philosophy, there are similarities between Leibniz’s view on infinity and 
Spinoza’s. The main theme running throughout Matthew Stewart’s The Courtier and the 
Heretic is that despite his public denouncements of Spinozistic philosophy, Leibniz had a 
secret admiration for the work of Spinoza. One area of overlap between the two thinkers 
emerges in the realm of the infinite. As explained in the opening chapter, prior to 
Spinoza, philosophy had classified “infinite” collections as merely being unbounded. 
Thus, to say that space is infinite wouldn’t actually mean that we consider it as an actual 
system containing every possible point.  Instead this “infinity” consists of having no 
bound, making it a potential infinity, rather than an actual one. Contrary to these potential 
infinities, the indivisible omnipotence of God is an actual infinite, not merely a potential 
one. We have already seen how Spinoza rejected the claim that nature doesn’t contain 
any actual infinities, and Leibniz’s philosophical work also sought to find a type of 
infinity within nature. 
 In Leibniz’s later philosophical system, he identified monads as the fundamental 
ontological units of the world. Admittedly, of all of the philosophical doctrines I’ve 
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studied, I find the nature of the monads to be one of the most puzzling. In Leibniz’s 
system, the monads function as the atomic units of reality. They are not spatially related, 
but their perceptions of one another constitute the spatial structure of the universe. 
However, we could identify an infinite number of perspectives for any given location, 
due to the dense nature of mathematical points. Perhaps this is why Leibniz says in the 
Monadology “Just as the same city viewed from different directions appears entirely 
different and, as it were, multiplied perspectively, in just the same way it happens that, 
because of the infinite multitude of the simple substances, there are, as it were, just as 
many universes, which are, nevertheless, only perspectives on a single one, 
corresponding to the different points of view of each monad.”50 Since Leibniz is 
committed to the actual existence of the atomic monads, he needs an account of how an 
infinite collection can exist in the natural world. 
 In addition to nature, Leibniz’s philosophical system also held that God is infinite. 
Even though Leibniz does not speak of infinite attributes, and Spinoza refrains from talk 
about us existing in the best of all possible worlds, both refer to God as infinite. In his “A 
Tale of Two Thinkers: One Meeting, and Three Degrees of Infinity,” Ohad Nachtomy 
draws the comparison that both philosophers use infinity in a non-numerical and non-
quantitative manner when referring to God.
51
 What this means for Spinoza has already 
been explained in detail, so I will focus on what Leibniz meant by the infinity of divine 
substance.  
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 For Leibniz, statements like “the number of all numbers” or “the greatest possible 
speed” were contradictory concepts. For instance, in the number of all numbers, it would 
be possible to have a part which was the size of the whole, as demonstrated by Galileo's 
Paradox, the conclusion explained in Chapter 1 that shows how a 1-1 correspondence can 
exist between the integers and perfect squares. Leibniz recognized these apparent 
contradictions and became worried about the following line of reasoning: 
 
(1) God contains all perfections. 
(2) Existence is a perfection 
(C) God exists. 
 
After all, if a collection containing all numbers could not exist (under Leibniz’s view of 
number, at least), what is different about the collection of all perfections? Leibniz found 
that this argument for the existence of God needed to be augmented to show the internal 
coherence of the first premise.
52
 Nachtomy argues that Leibniz’s search for an answer to 
this question is what leads him to seek answers in Spinoza’s work on infinity.  
 Like Spinoza, Leibniz also had three different categories of infinity: Omnia; 
Maximum; and Infinitum.
53
 The Omnia represented an entity which contained 
everything, while a Maximum contained everything of its kind. Thus, unbounded space 
could be infinite by being Maximum extension, but it is not Omnia, since it does not 
contain every time, every thought, and all other possible attributes (in a non-Spinozistic 
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sense) that God contains.
54
 And infinitum is “infinite in the lowest degree whose 
magnitude is greater than we can expound by sensible things, even though there exists 
something greater than those things.”55 Nachtomy points out that there is a 
correspondence between these three categories of infinity, and the three described by 
Spinoza. However, he claims only tentatively that the monads can fit into one of these 
categories, since it is not a question that Leibniz directly addresses. While an entire 
article could be written on the subject, I offer analogies between Leibnizian monads and 
the concept of infinite in kind. 
 As you may be tired of reading at this point, Spinoza’s view is that attributes are 
infinite in kind, meaning that Extension contains all of the extended modes. And as 
something which is infinite in kind, it cannot be changed by any extended mode. And due 
to Spinoza’s view of causality, nothing can affect it. Is there an analogue to this type of 
infinity in Leibniz’s account of nature? Although there is no perfect mapping between the 
type of infinity in by Spinoza’s attributes and Leibniz’s monads (what he sees as the 
fundamental building blocks of nature), there are numerous areas of overlap between 
these two doctrines. In his Monadology, Leibniz asserts that the monads have no “doors 
or windows” (find exact quote), meaning they cannot directly affected by any of the other 
monads, just as the attributes of Spinoza’s God cannot be affected by any other attribute. 
Unlike Spinoza’s account of attributes, however, monads are created by God, meaning 
they can be affected by forces external to themselves. However, the point remains that 
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each monad (also referred to as a created substance) cannot be destroyed or directly 
affected by any other mode, giving them an isolated autonomy similar to the attributes of 
Spinoza’s system. 
However, as strange as it may sound, monads “perceive” one another in some 
sense. And it is the collection of these perceptions from different viewpoints which create 
a relational harmony. This harmony is responsible for the phenomena on the macroscopic 
level of our daily lives.
56
 However, there is no genuine causal interaction among these 
modes in the standard sense of the term. Instead of my arm slamming on the desk being 
the result of mechanical interaction among matter, the monads all shift their perceptions 
to give rise to the new phenomena. So, instead of the monads in my hand perceiving 
themselves as being a few feet away from the monads in the desk, they have a new 
logical relationship which gives rise to a harmony where my hand is touching the desk. I 
realize how confusing that sounds, but it’s what Leibniz’s system boils down to. What’s 
important for the comparison with Spinoza is that there is no causal interaction occurring 
at this level. Instead of the monads in my hand acting on the ones in the table, there is a 
“pre-established harmony” which causes the monads to mirror themselves in a way that 
gives rise to this new arrangement once I form the volition to act. In this way, the monads 
are metaphysically autonomous from one another, just like Spinoza’s description of the 
attributes, yet they all share a similar structure, like the modes that exist within each 
attribute. Spinoza created a system in which such a being can be called infinite, yet be 
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“lesser” than the absolute infinity of God, and Leibniz used that distinction when giving 
his account of the world. 
ii. Cantor: The Father of Modern Set Theory 
In Letter 12, Spinoza concluded that “I do not believe there remains any question 
regarding the in finite on which I have not touched, or which cannot be readily solved 
from what I said.”57 About two hundred years later, Georg Cantor wrote in the Preface to 
his 1883 Foundations of a General Theory of Manifolds
58
 (hereafter referred to as the 
Grundlagen): “I do not believe that, in such a difficult, complicated, and all-embracing 
subject as the infinite, I shall have said the last word.”59 Despite differing claims in self-
importance, there is a compelling reason to believe that Cantor was influenced by 
Spinoza’s treatment of infinity. In Section 5 of his Grundlagen, Cantor lists Spinoza, 
along with Locke, Descartes, and Leibniz, as important figures who helped cement the 
tradition of finitism in mathematics. However, he also mentions Spinoza’s Letter 12 in 
the next paragraph, calling it “the highly important letter, rich in content, of Spinoza to L. 
Meyer,” and he promised a work which would provide an analysis of this letter, as well 
as the work of other philosophers.
60
 Unfortunately, this work was never produced; but 
there are still compelling reasons to hold that not only was Cantor familiar with Spinoza’s 
work, but that it also influenced Cantor’s own developments. 
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 One of the primary developments in Cantor’s Grundlagen is the concept of the 
transfinite ordinal. These newly-discovered numbers gave Cantor the ability to 
hypothesize a well-ordering of infinite sets. The first transfinite ordinal is denoted by ω, 
and comes from taking the set of all natural numbers in their typical order. Cantor’s 
innovation was to not only call ω a number, but to show that numbers exist which come 
after ω. The strange thing about these infinite ordinals is that the familiar property of 
commutativity of addition fails. In finite ordinals, it’s obvious to us that 5+7 = 7+5, 
which equals 12. However, the number which comes directly after ω is ω + 1, which is 
different than 1 + ω. 1 + ω is simply ω.61 While this fact may be old news to readers 
familiar with set theory, one immensely interesting aspect is how Cantor introduces the 
failure of commutativity: with a discussion on Spinozistic metaphysics. He starts §5.6 
with “An especially difficult point in Spinoza’s system is the relationship of the finite 
modes to the infinite one; it remains unexplained how and under what circumstances the 
finite can maintain its independence with respect to the infinite, or the infinite with 
respect to still higher infinities.” As seen in Chapter 3 of this thesis, Spinoza’s theory of 
infinite modes is still puzzling to scholars and the fact that Cantor alluded to this 
technical question and offered his own solution is good evidence that he had a strong 
understanding of Spinoza’s works. Cantor’s remedy to stopping the infinite modes from 
absorbing the finite is to focus on the way that infinite quantities are ordered. He says that 
if the finite is placed before the infinite, “it merges into the infinite and vanishes therein; 
but if it contents itself to take its place after the infinite it is preserved and unites with it 
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to form a new, because modified, infinite.” And with this sentence, Cantor ends §5 of his 
Grundlagen. Although this does not answer puzzles about the properties of infinite 
modes and their role in nature, the view that the finite modes would disappear if placed in 
the sequence of the infinite modes (like how finite integers only change the value of an 
ordinal if added in the right way) is a possible way to conceive of the logical relation 
between the finite and infinite modes. 
 Additionally, Cantor disagreed with Spinoza’s view that the infinite cannot be 
represented as a number due to the paradoxes which arise. Take Spinoza’s example in 
IP15schol of assigning a number to the infinite measure of the universe in feet. He argues 
that we could also count that distance in inches, making it 12 times the infinity of the 
measurement in feet. This would make one infinity be twelve times another infinity, 
which Spinoza regarded as absurd. However, Cantor’s insight into the nature of infinity 
shows that regardless of which units we use, we’ll end up with the same number of 
infinite units if we count with discrete units. Also, even though the interval [0, 1] is 
longer than [0, 2], if we want to list the sizes of real-number points which lie on both 
lines, we actually end up with the same infinite measure, . To return to the example of 
the two non-concentric circles Spinoza gives in Letter 12, it turns out that the “number of 
distances” in each section is the same , regardless of which portion of the diagram we 
discuss. Cantor’s resolution involves recognizing that Spinoza’s dismissal of infinite 
numbers was based on the tacit assumption that the properties of finite numbers should 
hold in the domain of the infinite.
62
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So far, I have compared and contrasted Cantor and Spinoza’s views on infinities 
which can be divided in the mind. But as I hope this thesis has made clear, there is more 
to Spinoza’s theory of the infinite than these groups of cases. Instead, Spinoza demands 
that we keep the infinity of Substance in our minds when discussing infinity. Recall that 
this type of infinity does not involve parthood, and cannot be represented as finite 
without losing coherence. And even though Cantor doesn’t share every aspect of this 
view, there are close parallels which can be made between Spinoza’s first type of infinity, 
and Cantor’s concept of the absolute infinite. 
 As opposed to the infinitely infinite infinity of transfinite numbers (and even that 
hyperbole fails to capture just how many different transfinite numbers there are), Cantor 
believed that there was a type of infinity which could not be captured mathematically, 
which pertained to God alone.
63
 In her “Cantor on Infinity in Nature, Number, and the 
Divine Mind,” Anne Newstead gives a compelling account of how Cantor’s separation 
between the absolute infinite and the transfinite allowed him to keep his views consistent 
with Catholic Theology. In a 1886 letter to Cardinal Johannes Franzelin, Cantor is careful 
to distinguish his theory from the then-fashionable heresy of pantheism. By showing that 
it was possible for an actual infinity to exist without contradiction, it would be possible 
that God could be contained in the world, resulting in pantheism. Or so the German 
Idealists of the time thought. 
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 One of the techniques Cantor uses to distinguish himself from pantheism was to 
put forth three different kinds of infinity.
64
 First, there are the Abstract infinites, which 
are the numbers subject to mathematical analysis, such as ω, ω2, and ε0. Then there is the 
Concrete infinite, which can be found in nature, and would be the unbounded nature of 
space and time. And finally, there is the Absolute infinite, which is possessed by God 
alone. Cantor says that pantheism arrives by conflating the Concrete infinite with the 
Absolute infinite, and he even uses the Spinozistic language of “natura naturata” to 
describe the Concrete infinite, and “natura naturans” to describe God’s infinity in one of 
his letters to Cardinal Franzelin.
65
 Therefore, just as Spinoza held that God could not be 
identified with the modes of the universe, Cantor held that the infinity present in God 
could not be identified as a collection of transfinite measurements or orderings. And since 
it is not a proper set, the Absolute infinite and the transfinite are different in kind, not 
degree. As should be familiar by this point, this is exactly what Spinoza believed. 
 There is one further concern about Cantor’s Absolute infinity. Was it a genuine 
belief that Cantor had, or was it his way of protecting himself from accusations of 
heresy? And if Cantor genuinely believed this theory, is it a theory worth retaining? As 
for the first question, I think it’s a belief Cantor genuinely held, due to evidence present 
in one of Cantor’s letters to Dedekind, where he points out that the well-ordered sequence 
of all numbers (which Cantor denotes with Ω) cannot have a number associated with it. 
For if it did, then that number, δ, would occur at a fixed location in Ω, since it contains all 
numbers in a well-ordered manner. But δ is a number, so then δ + 1 would be a number in 
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Ω greater than δ, meaning that δ is not the largest number. Thus, even though Cantor 
disproved Spinoza’s claim that there could be no infinite number by showing that we 
cannot apply our all of our intuitions about finite collections to the realm of the infinite, it 
is still true that just as there is no largest finite number, there can be no largest transfinite 
number. For this reason, Cantor calls Ω “an inconsistent, absolutely infinite 
multiplicity”66 Although Cantor’s work with infinity showed that the number 
corresponding to an infinite distance measured in feet would be the same as that same 
length measured in inches (contrary to Spinoza’s discussion in IP15S), he still recognized 
that not every infinite quantity could be assigned a number, finite or infinite. Whereas 
Cantor thought both finite and transfinite and transfinite sets could be correlated with a 
definite number, he was aware that Ω, the set of all ordinals, could not be given the same 
treatment. Therefore, Cantor appears to have acknowledged that not every collection is a 
proper set.
67
 This is an approach shared by von-Neuman-Bernays-Gödel (NBG) set 
theory, which divides collections into two different categories. Sets are collections which 
can be members of other collections. Therefore, ω is a set under the standard definition of 
an ordinal, since it is an element of ω + 1, as well as the higher infinite ordinals. NBG set 
theory adds the concept of proper classes, which are collections that are not elements of 
any set. One example of a proper class is the set of all sets. Since it is not itself a set, it is 
not included in this collection, which avoids the paradoxes associated with the set of all 
sets. The other major system of axiomatic set theory, Zermelo-Frankel, does not include 
the concept of proper class. Instead, it places limits on constructing sets, which block the 
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creation of sets using properties like {x|x=x}, which would be the set of all sets. Even 
though Cantor’s Absolute Infinite may have lost the metaphysical association with God, 
modern set theory continues to acknowledge that collections such as Cantor’s Ω or the 
universal class V are different kinds of entities than ω or א. 
 Therefore, even though Cantor expanded the reach of the numbers, he 
acknowledged the Spinozistic point that some concepts remain outside of their grasp. In 
fact, Hallett argues that one of the primary lessons of set theory is that even when dealing 
with a hierarchy of infinite measures, there are still concepts which are too large for set 
theory to handle in the same way as transfinite sets (Hallett, p. 165). 
iii. Conclusion 
No matter how we frame it, infinity is weird. Most of our normal intuitions about 
how objects and relations should interact go straight out the window once we reach an 
infinite domain. Spinoza recognized this fact, and used it to say that one type of infinity is 
not adequate to explain all of the intuitions that we have. For instance, the intuition that 
multiplication and addition yield larger quantities is captured by the third kind of infinity, 
the one which applies to measure, time, and number. And calling God infinite means 
something completely different than calling quantity and duration infinite, so Spinoza had 
different types of infinity for those two concepts. Although we can question whether or 
not the domain in question really has the properties that Spinoza thinks they should, or 
whether or not Spinoza was consistent in calling God indivisible despite recognizing the 
differences among the attributes, we should acknowledge that he had a developed theory 
of infinity. Furthermore, his theory is not some dusty pre-Cantorian mess which should 
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be looked on as outdated. Rather, it should be seen as a historical source of many of our 
contemporary theories. 
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